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Abstract. Extensible Component Platforms support the discovery, in-
stallation, starting, uninstallation of components at runtime. Since they
are often targeted at mobile resource-constraint devices, they have both
strong performance and security requirements. The current security model
for Java systems, Permissions, are based on call stack analysis. They
proves to be very time-consuming, which makes them difficult to use in
production environments.
We therefore define the Component-Based Access Control (CBAC) Se-
curity Model, which aims at emulating Java Permissions through static
analysis at the installation phase of the components. CBAC is based on a
fully declarative approach, that makes it possible to tag arbitrary meth-
ods as sensitive. A formal model is defined to guarantee that a given
component have sufficient access rights, and that dependencies between
components are taken into account. A first implementation of the model
is provided for the OSGi Platform, using the ASM library for code anal-
ysis. Performance tests show that the cost of CBAC at install time is
negligible, because it is executed together with digital signature which
is much more costly. Moreover, contrary to Java Permissions, the CBAC
security model does not imply any runtime overhead.
Introduction
Extensible Component Platforms enable the composition of components that
are provided by several issuers, and that can be loaded, installed, uninstalled, at
runtime. In the Java world, such platforms can be Java Cards[17], MIDP [12], or
the OSGi platform [14]. The functional composition is supported for instance,
in the case of the OSGi Platform, through an efficient support of dependency
resolution. Composition of non-functional properties, such as security, as so far
not supported in such systems.
So as to support the composition of access rights of components, we propose
the Component-based (CBAC) Security Model. The objective is to replace Java
Permissions through validation of the access rights through static code analysis:
0 This work is partially funded by MUSE II IST FP6 Project n026442.
Permissions prove to be difficult to use in production environment due to the
important overhead they imply at runtime1, To do so, we take advantage of
the installation phase of the bundles to perform suitable checks, so as to relieve
the runtime phase from costly checks. The advantages of this approach based
on static-analysis are numerous. The main ones are the gain of performance at
runtime, the absence of program abortion, and the flexibility of policy expression.
This latter is fully declarative, which makes it possible to protect additional JVM
methods (Threads, ClassLoader) and component methods.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the existing security
models for Java Component Platforms. Section 2 presents the CBAC Security
Model. Section 3 presents the validation of our approach. Section 4 concludes
this work.
1 Security Models for Java Component Platforms
Because it has been designed with security in mind, and because it has been
subject to extensible testing by the community after its initial releases, the Java
Virtual Machine [13] is usually considered as a very secure execution platform.
Various security mechanisms have been proposed to build secure Java Plat-
forms. In this section, we review them so as to identify whether they provide suit-
able solutions for Component Platforms. First, the J2SE security mechanisms
are presented. Then, optimizations for access control through static analysis,
which allows to relieve the component runtime from verification overhead, are
discussed. Lastly, security mechanisms for Component Systems are presented.
1.1 Java Security
The security properties of the Java Component Platform are supported by the
Virtual Machine itself, which provides a platform that fully isolates - if required -
the applications from their environment. These mechanisms build a sound basis
to support a specific Access Control mechanism based on method calls stack
inspection, Stack-based Access Control (SBAC).
The Java Virtual Machine is characterized by following built-in security fea-
tures, that makes it safe: type safety, automatic memory management, Bytecode
validation and secure class loading.
Type Safety ensures that programs can not generate type mismatching, and
can not execute elements that are not functions [21]. It aims at preventing the
use of pointers to execute arbitrary code and to prevent buffer overflows.
Automatic memory management is performed through Garbage Collection.
It prevents memory leak, and relieves the developer from memory management,
which is error prone. Automatic memory management ensures that no old func-
tions stay available for undue future use.
1 Our tests shows that the performance loss amounts between 55% and 144% for
specific calls
Bytecode validation consists in checking the compliance to the JVM specifi-
cation of the executable code before it is loaded for execution. This prevents in
particular the delivery of malicious code in an untrusted component, that could
not be generated by a compiler but would be forged to abuse the platform.
Secure class-loading provides a sound namespace isolation between different
ClassLoaders. The namespace isolation ensures that no conflict occurs when in-
dependent components provides classes with the same name - and that no access
is possible to objects and classes that are not purposely made publicly available.
Some platforms have been developed, that allow to re-establish and control the
access between ClassLoaders: the OSGi is an example [14]. Secure class-loading
therefore allows the concurrent execution of applications that should not interact
with each others.
SBAC: the Java Security Architecture Thanks to these language-level security
properties, access control models can be defined in Java-based System.
The initial paradigm is Sandboxing, which prevents an untrusted application
(such as an Applet) to access the host system [9]. This restrictive view of security
has been extended to allow secure execution of partially trusted code [11]: an ap-
plication could need to access the file system, but may not be trusted to perform
network communications, to avoid backdoors. In this case, granted permissions
would allow ‘FilePermission’, but no ‘SocketPermission’, for instance.
To support such a security model, Stack-based Access Control (SBAC) is
used. Whenever a sensitive call is reached, the whole call stack is re-built, and
the different Protection Domains of the code are identified. A Protection Domain
matches a code signer (i.e. code provider), or a specific code location on the local
file system. For each Protection Domain, access is granted to a certain number of
actions. If all Protection Domains are associated with sufficient grants to execute
the whole call stack, the sensitive call is executed. Otherwise, the call is aborted
and an Exception is launched.
SBAC provides a fine-grained security models, that is tightly integrated in
the JVM, and in the application. However, it has also several limitations. First,
the permissions are defined programmatically, and can not be extended for ad-
ditional methods. Secondly, the program aborts if no sufficient permissions are
available, which can cause significant user trouble. Thirdly, the runtime per-
formance overhead is important, and often causes the security features to be
neglected in production systems. Significant optimization efforts have been done
[10], but performance overhead in unavoidable when the whole call stack is to
be rebuilt at each check.
1.2 Static Analysis for Optimization of Runtime Checks
The performance overhead at runtime that is implied by the SBAC paradigm
urge the optimization of the verification process. Two main solutions exist: opti-
mization of runtime analysis, and identification and removal of redundant checks.
The first approach to SBAC optimization is to perform optimization of run-
time analysis, through static analysis before the execution. This approach avoids
rebuilding the call stack at each security check.
The process is the following: an abstract model of the code is built out of
the program code, and exploited at the check point, instead of the actual call
stack. One method used to perform validation and to make this abstract model
throughout the code is Security Passing Style (SPS) [19, 20]. SPS consists in
rewriting method calls to add an additional parameter, which is a pointer to the
abstract model. This method can be used to enforce arbitrary security model.
Its application to SBAC is presented by [19, 20].
Optimization can be done through two different strategies: eager [4, 5] and
lazy [8] computation of the program state. The eager approach avoids numerous
re-computation, when the number of security checks is high. The lazy approach
provides usually better performances, since security checks are usually scarce in
the code. Both strategies are proved to be formally equivalent [3].
The main limitation of static analysis is that the abstract model of the pro-
gram builds a slightly bigger set than the actual call stack. This causes a (limited)
number of false positive.
The second approach to SBAC optimization is the identification and removal
of redundant checks. Actually, when a given piece of code has the right to access
a given file, this right will not be withdrawn if the same code - with the same
call stack - have a renewed access to the file.
Removal of redundant checks and of dead code is defined in an abstract way
by [6]. Algorithmic example of such removal is given by [3]. The implementation
of these models can be done with call graphs [8].
Removal of redundant checks is performed as a complement to optimization of
call stack computation, and uses the same techniques of code rewriting. It implies
an additional overhead during code analysis, but provides only performance gain
at runtime.
Such optimization does not solve all drawbacks of the SBAC model. The
runtime overhead is still non negligible, and the conservation of runtime checks
preserves program abortion, which is not compatible with a satisfactory user
experience.
1.3 Securing Java Components
The strong security features that are provided by the JVM, and the sound mod-
ular support, enables Component Platforms to be defined, so as to enable the
realization of complex applications through software composition. Securing these
component platforms is done in two steps. First, the deployment must be secured.
For more information related to this aspect, see [15] and [16]. It will not be con-
sidered further here. Secondly, access control must be adapted to support the
dynamic life-cycle of the components.
Dynamic Permissions In single application Java systems, permissions to ac-
cess sensitive methods are set statically in the java.policy file. In extensi-
ble component platforms, where components are installed, started, stopped and
uninstalled at runtime, these permissions must be set at runtime. Dynamic per-
missions are therefore defined: for each issuer, a specific permission set is given.
When components from new issuers are installed, a suitable permission set is in-
troduced. Dynamic permissions are defined both in MIDP [1], and in OSGi [14].
However, few implementations seem to be actually available, which let think
that the specified solutions do not match widespread use cases with a satisfac-
tory usability level. The main restriction is the following: dynamic permissions
are often set by the user when required. This causes an uncomfortable alterna-
tive: either the program crashes in the middle of a computation, or the user is
disturbed every now and then to add new permissions which consequences she
does not understand. Moreover, software composition and the interdependence
between components is not taken into account. Dynamic permissions also have
the same drawbacks as standard permission: runtime performance overhead, and
the impossibility of defining new permissions type, which could be necessary in
highly dynamic environments.
Due to a lack of maturity, the current dynamic permissions for software
component platforms do not seem to be well suited for their target applications.
Taking Composition into Account for building secure Systems The specific
programming paradigm that is implied by software composition provides new
anchors to build secure software: the component life-cycle management support,
and the interaction between the components. However, none of them are so far
exploited in security specifications, which are directly derived from monolithic
security mechanisms.
The life-cycle support provides a suitable check point for security control,
that enable disturbance free execution: the install phase. Currently, only digital
signature validation is performed at this moment. More control, such as static
analysis, could be introduced, to relieve the runtime from performance overhead
and impaired user experience that is caused by standard execution permissions.
The interaction between the components can be exploited at this install time
check point. Actually, dependency resolution is performed during this phase. Ex-
tending the performed computation with security checks would prevent a later
analysis of the program state and call stack, and make it possible to validate the
security properties of the applications before they are launched. Consequently,
runtime checks would be greatly limited, which would prevent unpleasant pro-
gram abortion - or dangerous user intervention.
2 The CBAC Security Model
The CBAC - Component-based Access Control - Security Model aims at taking
advantages of the specific properties of software composition, to propose a secu-
rity model that is both more performant and more suitable to the use cases of
Java Component Platforms.
2.1 Principles
The principle of the CBAC Security Model is to perform an install time analysis
of the installed components, while taking the emerging compositional properties
into account.
The access rights for a component that is to be installed are checked im-
mediately before its installation. If the rights are sufficient, the component is
installed. It they are not, the component is rejected. The access rights must be
computed in two complementary fashions: first, the component must not perform
forbidden actions itself; secondly, the component must not depend on compo-
nents that perform actions that it is not allowed to perform. This interdiction
must consider two specific cases: privileged components, that can perform sen-
sitive actions on behalf of others with less rights (for instance a log service must
access the file system, but the logged component need not to have itself the
access right to the log file); services, which build runtime dependencies, and are
used in Service-Oriented Programming [7] environments.
2.2 Hypotheses
The CBAC Security Model is valid when the two following hypotheses are valid:
– the component platform itself is not modified i.e. the process of access right
verification can not be tampered with. This can be obtained through the use
of a Trusted Computing Base [2].
– each component contains a valid digital signature, which guarantees that no
modification has been done to the component archive, and that the compo-
nent signer name is unique and known by the platform2.
The CBAC Security Model is defined to fully support secure OSGi appli-
cations. Since it considers fundamental properties of software composition, it
should be easily adaptable to other specifications of component platforms. How-
ever, it may be that specific options or features are not defined.
2.3 Modelization
The definition of CBAC is performed in three steps.
First, CBAC is defined for one component. When a single component is
installed, does it own the rights to execute all the method calls it performs ?
The dependencies to other bundles are not considered, and sensitive methods
from the platform API only are considered.
Secondly, CBAC is defined for N components. When a component is installed
that has dependencies to other, does it have sufficient rights to execute the
method calls it performs both directly and indirectly via the dependencies ?
Suitable grants are to be available for the whole call stack.
Thirdly, CBAC is defined for B components, taking into account the pro-
tection of component methods. The methods provided by the platform can be
tagged as ‘sensitive’, as well as the ones provided by bundles. This means that
if a given bundle has a method that triggers a malicious action, such as e.g.
sending private data over the network, its access can be restricted.
2 In particular, this implies that default Java Archive signature tools should not be
used [16]
Static Permissions for one Component Hypotheses Following parameters are
defined to describe security policy-related entities in a dynamic extensible com-
ponent platform:
b : a given bundle,
pf : the Component Platform,
C : the set of calls made by a bundle,
S : the set of all sensitive method calls in the Platform API,
I : the set of all innocuous method calls in the Platform API,
CS = C
⋂
S : the set of all sensitive method calls made by a bundle,
CI = C
⋂
I : the set of all innocuous method calls made by a bundle,
{p} : the set of bundle providers,
Ap : the set of authorized sensitive calls for the provider p ∈ {p}, i.e. the policy
for the provider p.
Theorem CBAC permissions for one component (CBAC 1C) are valid if:
p, pf, b ⊢ CS ∧ Ap, CI (1)
with PSCpf,b = CS
PSCpf,b is the set of Performed Sensitive Calls by the bundle b on the Plat-
form pf . This means that the set of Performed Sensitive Calls by the bundle b
on the Platform pf is the set of sensitive calls that are identified in the bundle.
These calls are explicitely allowed by the security policy Ap. Otherwise, that is
to say if some sensitive calls that b may perform is not allowed by the policy,
the bundle is rejected. This mechanism supports robust coarse-grained access
control policies.
Proof A bundle b is associated with the calls C it performs on the platform.
A platform pf is associated with the set of sensitive calls S, and the set of
innocuous calls i it makes available. C is a part of S and I. Thus, the platform
pf and the bundle b are associated to C, and consequently to the set of sensitive
calls it performs CS , which is a subset of C.
The bundle provider p is associated with the policy Ap, which is defined at
the platform level. If the permission is given, the performed sensitive calls CS
build a subset of the policy for p. Consequently, CS and Ap build a coherent
policy for the bundle b provided by p on the platform pf . b can thus be installed.
If the permission is denied, CS is not a subset of p, and CS and Ap do not build
a coherent policy. b can not be installed.
A demonstration with Sequent Calculus is given in appendix A.
Static Permissions for N Components - with Protection of Platform and Bundle
Calls The computation of the component validation status for a new component
must consider two types of bundles in the dependency tree:
– Leaves L: the components that have dependencies to platform-provided pack-
ages only (simple applications, or libraries),
– Nodes N: the components that have dependencies both to the Platform and
to other components (complex applications, GUI ...).
The Figure 1 shows an example of a dependency tree for a default configu-
ration of the Apache Felix platform (version 1.0), which is an implementation of
the OSGi R4 Specifications.
Fig. 1. The Dependency Tree for a default Configuration of the Apache Felix Platform
Hypotheses Following parameters are defined to describe security policy-
related entities in a dynamic extensible component platform for N components:
bi : the ID of the considered bundle,
{b}i : the list of bundles on which the bundle i depends,
CSpf,bi : the sensitive calls performed by the bundle i directly to the platform,
or directly to the bundles on which it depends,
Api : the set of authorized sensitive calls for the provider p of the bundle i,
PSCbi : the set of Performed Sensitive Calls by the bundle i, directly to the
Platform or via method calls to other bundles,
PSCpf,bi : the set of Performed Sensitive Calls by the bundle i that are made
directly to the Platform, or directly to the bundles on which it depends,
PSC{b}i : the set of Performed Sensitive Calls by the bundles on which the
bundle i depends. PSC{b}i =
∑
bj in {b}i
PSCbj .
Theorem The computation of the validation status of a component can be
made recursively.
• A leaf component bi ∈ L is valid if:
bi, pi, pf ⊢ Api ∧ CSpf,bi , CIpf,bi (2)
with PSCpf,bi = CSpf,bi
Which matches the case for one single component.
• A node component N is valid if:
bi, pi, pf ⊢ Api ∧ PSC{b}i ,¬PSC{b}i (3)
with PSCbi = CSpf,bi ∨ PSC{b}j (4)
PSCbi is the set of Performed Sensitive Calls by the bundle bi b on the
Platform pf or on the bundles on which it depends. This means that a bundle
can be installed when the sensitive calls that are made directly to the platform
and all sensitive calls that are made via other bundles are allowed by the current
policy.
Proof This can be demonstrated with the following argument through re-
cursion.
Suppose that the set of Performed Sensitive Calls for the bundle k, PSCbk ,
is available for all bundles k that are already installed on the gateway. The
objective is to determine whether the bundle i, which has dependencies to a set
of bundle bj , can be installed without breaking the access control policy. The
value of PSCbi , the set of Performed Sensitive Calls for the bundle i, can then
be extracted.
A demonstration with Sequent Calculus is given in appendix B.
The implementation of the CBAC security model for N components requires
two complementary mechanisms: checking at install time for the calls that are
made directly from the bundle to be installed to the platform, and building of
the dependency tree to verify that the required permissions are granted. The
bundle bi can only be installed if a valid dependency tree can be identified.
The mechanism presented so far provides a minimal enforcement process
for execution permissions, that can yet be used to protect real applications.
As for the CBAC model for one component, the benefits are the absence of
runtime overhead, and the declarative - and thus extensible - policy declaration
mechanism.
The limitations are the following. First, the validation is performed at a quite
coarse-grain level. For instance, the installation of an application can be denied
because it relies on a library that contains forbidden sensitive methods, even
though these methods are never called. This can occurs for instance in the case
of conditional instructions. Secondly, it is not possible to define sensitive method
calls that would be provided by the components themselves.
The mechanism of protection of bundle calls shows both the flexibility and
limitation of component-grained static access control. The advantage is that
permissions can be set in a declarative manner, that is to say that contrary to
default Java Permissions, any call can be considered as ‘sensible‘ - for instance
for a particular application type, or in case a vulnerability is discovered. The
limitation is that component-grained access control does not provide the policy
designer with context-dependent behavior: if a given sensitive method is used
only in rare cases or is never used, but forbidden by the policy, the bundle can
not be installed.
Advanced Features To as to provide a proper protection of OSGi-based applica-
tions, several advanced features have to be defined.
The first feature is Privileged Method Calls. Privilege calls means that a
given component can execute sensitive calls, even though the initial caller of the
method does not own sufficient rights. This is for instance the case of logging
mechanisms. An component from a less trusted provider can log its action on a
file through the platform logger without having access rights to the file system.
The second advanced feature, which is provided by the CBAC model thanks
to its declarative nature, is the support of Positive and Negative Permissions.
Negative permissions are set by identifying a given method call as ‘sensitive’.
Positive Permissions are set by allowing a given signer to execute some methods.
A more flexible expression could be introduced in the future, in particular so as to
support negative permissions without impacting the policies for other providers.
The last required feature is to support Access Control for Service Calls. The
OSGi Platform support Service Oriented Programming (SOP) [7], and thus calls
through services that are published inside the platform. Since the services are
resolved at runtime, a runtime mechanism is to be defined that enforces the
CBAC policy for these service. Otherwise, package level access control can be
by-passed through service calls.
3 Validation
The validation of the Component-Based Access Control model is performed
through its implementation, performance analysis and identification of the ad-
vantages and drawbacks of the current prototype.
The principle of CBAC is the following. When an OSGi bundle is to be
installed on an OSGi Platform, its digital signature is checked. If this latter is
valid, the CBAC Engine verifies whether the bundle signers have sufficient rights
to execute all the code that is contained in the archive. If enforced policies do
allows it, the bundle is installed, and then executed without further constraints.
Otherwise, it is rejected.
The innovation of the approach is to take advantage of the installation phase
of the OSGi bundles to perform access right verification.
3.1 Implementation
The implementation of the CBAC security model is presented in this section.
Development choices are justified, and the integration with the Secure Felix 3
platform is given. Expression of CBAC policies are then given, along with an
example.
The implementation of the CBAC Model is performed on the Felix4 imple-
mentation of the OSGi framework. Static Bytecode analysis is performed with
the ASM5 library, which is much smaller than other libraries for Bytecode ma-
3 http://sfelix.gforge.inria.fr
4 http://felix.apache.org/
5 http://asm.objectweb.org/
nipulation, such as BCEL 6 or SERP7. An earlier prototype has also been built
using the Findbugs framework, which often implies an overhead of more than
100% in performance.
The CBAC model is part of a research project conducted at the Amazones
Team of the INRIA (CITI Laboratory, INSA-Lyon, France), that aims at defining
a secure OSGi platform. It is therefore integrated with SFelix, which support
a proper verification of the digital signature of OSGi bundles [16]. SFelix is
modified so as to make the list of valid signers available for the CBAC Engine.
This latter can then check whether the signers have suitable rights to execute
all the methods that it contains.
An example of CBAC policy is given in the listing 1: a policy file cbac.policy,
defines sensitive methods and required grants for a given signer. The syntax is
similar to Java Permissions ‘java.policy’ files.
sensitiveMethods {
java.io.ObjectInputStream.defaultReadObject;
java.io.ObjectInputStream.writeInt;
java.security.*;
java.security.KeyStore.*;
java.io.FileOutputStream.<init>;
};
sensitiveManifestAttributes {
Fragment-Host;
}
grant Signer:bob {
Fragment-Host;
java.io.ObjectInputStream.defaultReadObject;
java.io.ObjectInputStream.writeInt;
java.io.FileOutputStream.<init>;
java.security.Security.addProvider;
java.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException.<init>;
java.security.KeyStore.getInstance;
...
};
Table 1. Example of the cbac.policy File
CBAC policy is defined as follows. A list of sensitive methods, and one of sen-
sitive OSGi-related meta-data are defined. If a bundle contains sensitive meth-
ods or meta-data, its provider must be granted the right to execute them all.
Otherwise, it is rejected at install time. The policies are defined according to a
6 http://jakarta.apache.org/bcel/
7 http://serp.sourceforge.net/
declarative approach: it is possible to mark any method call as being sensitive.
This makes it possible to protect the framework against vulnerabilities that are
discovered after the release of the platform. On the contrary, Java Permissions
mechanisms, that are coded in the framework itself, freeze the set of sensitive
methods when the platforms (or any application) is released.
3.2 Performances
The main objective of the CBAC model is to relieve the OSGi platforms, which
are often executed in resource-constraint environments, from the overhead that
is implied by Java Permission at runtime. It is therefore important to control
that the performances of the system are not too much impacted by this new
mechanism.
Tests have been performed with the implementation of the CBAC security
model for one component. Figure 2 shows the duration of the CBAC check only,
and Figure 3 shows the performance of Digital Signature validation and CBAC
Check, which are to be performed together to ensure the validity of the analysis.
It highlights the fact that for a limited number of sensitive methods (which is
usually the case), the overhead implied by CBAC is negligible when compared
to the duration of digital signature check. Note that the abscissa is not linear,
but represents the size of the various bundles that are available in the Felix
distribution of the OSGi Platform.
Fig. 2. Performances of OSGi Security:
CBAC Check only
Fig. 3. Performances of OSGi Security:
Signature and CBAC Check
The test are conducted for all the bundles that are provided together with the
Apache Felix distribution, utility bundles and tests bundles. The performance
overhead for small bundles (less that 25 KBytes) is less than 20 ms (between 3,2%
and 6,7% of the total validation process). For bigger ones (up to 130 KBytes),
less than 40 ms are required (less than 7,7% of the total validation process).
Out of the 59 test bundles, only five have a longer verification time. The bigger
bundles are 350 KBytes, 356 and 602 KBytes big, and require respectively 115,
116 and 141 ms. Since the digital signature for these bundles is checked in more
that one second, the overhead implied by CBAC can be considered as negligible.
3.3 Advantages and Limitations
The innovation of the CBAC approach is to take advantage of the installation
phase of the OSGi bundles to perform access right verification. Identified advan-
tages and known drawbacks are now presented.
The CBAC Model, when used together with a Hardened Version of the OSGi
Platform [15], support a better protection that other available security mecha-
nism, such as Java Permission. This is shown in Figure 4. The 25% of unprotected
vulnerabilities are presented in our Technical Report on OSGi vulnerability [15],
and, interestingly enough, are due to the Java Virtual Machine, and not the OSGi
Platform. This means that other Java Platforms also present these weaknesses.
Fig. 4. Protection Rate of existing OSGi Security Mechanisms: CBAC and others
The identified advantages of CBAC are the following:
– no runtime overhead (contrary to Java Permissions),
– no application abortion due to unsufficient execution rights (contrary to Java
Permissions),
– no unsecure behavior of the users, which are driven with classical permission
into allowing the execution of all untrusted code [18],
– possibility of defining arbitrary sensitive methods and meta-data, which
makes it possible to protect the system from vulnerabilities that are dis-
covered after the platform release.
Moreover, the expression of policies is simpler that in the case of Java Permission,
since it is declarative rather that programmative. Since the syntax is very similar,
they can very easily be learned by Java developers.
The known drawback of the CBAC approach are the following:
– false positives are to be expected when compared to Java Permission. This
may not be a problem if the configuration (e.g. the trusted signers, the ap-
plicative bundles) of the target platforms is known beforehand, as is currently
the case in most OSGi-based systems: sufficient permissions can be set at
design time. However, it can be a restriction for pervasive systems, which
require an important interoperability of mutually unknown code.
– install time overhead (negligible, as shown in Figures 2 and 3),
– disk space consumption (333 KBytes, 319 KBytes of which are built by the -
unmodified - ASM library). Our current prototype is much smaller than the
original implementation as Findbugs Plugin (2,026 MBytes, mostly because
of the Findbugs and BCEL libraries, that amounts to 2,003 MByte), and
much more performant (between 40 and 60 % of benefits for the various
archives). So as to be used in embedded systems, the unused code of the
library is to be pruned.
The formalization of CBAC is given in this study, and a first validation is given
based both on qualitative and quantitative criteria, which show that the CBAC
model is a performant and useful approach to Access Control for Extensible
Component Platforms, such as the OSGi Platform.
4 Conclusions and Perspectives
We propose the Component-Based Access (CBAC) Security Model for enforcing
access control in Extensible Component Platforms. The principle is to take ad-
vantage of the installation phase of the components to perform static analysis,
and to check that the composition of software components does not break the
defined policies.
CBAC is in particular defined so as to overcome the known limitation of
standards Java Permissions, which are often considered as too heavyweight to
be used in production environments. The tests that we perform show that these
objective is achieved, even though at the cost of additional false positives. The
current limitations of our implementation is that the support of dependencies
(CBAC for N components) is currently defined, but not yet implemented. More-
over, the validation in a real system is still to be performed, to as to check
whether the defined policy language is flexible enough. So far, there is no reason
to think that this is not the case.
Two directions of future works are to be considered. First, the CBAC secu-
rity model is to be tested for other specifications of component platforms, for
instance Java MIDP Profile, or non-Java environments. Our prototype has been
tested over the OSGi Platform, but only limited OSGi-specific features have
been introduced, and adaptation should not pose major issues.
Secondly, the prototype is to be validated in resource-constraint environ-
ments, so as to ensure that the process is lightweight enough to be used in PDA
or set-top boxes.
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A Static Permissions for one Component - Demonstration
The demonstration of the Theorem for validating CBAC for one component can
be prove through sequent Calculus:
CBAC 1C =
b ⊢ C pf ⊢ S, I
pf, b ⊢ C, S, I S, I ⊢ C
pf, b, S, I ⊢ C, S, IC
pf, b ⊢ C C ⊢ CS , CI
pf, b ⊢ CS , CI p ⊢ Ap
p, pf, b ⊢ CS ∧ Ap, CI
with C ⊢ CS ∧ CI
C ⊢ CS
and C ⊢ CS ∧ CI
C ⊢ CI
Which describes a Component Platform pf , with a given bundle b to be
installed, provider by a bundle provider p. Under this configuration, the con-
junction of the called Sensitive methods CS and the list of Authorized methods
by the security policy Ap must be valid.
Which is tantamount to:
If Permission is given:
CBAC 1C =
CS ⊢ Ap ∧ CS
p, pf, b ⊢ CS ∧ Ap, CI ⊢ Ap ∧ CS ,¬CS
p, pf, b ⊢ CS ∧ Ap ∧ (Ap ∧ CS),¬CS , CI
p, pf, b ⊢ CS ∧ Ap, CI
If Permission is refused:
CBAC 1C =
CS ⊢ ¬Ap ∧ CS
p, pf, b ⊢ CS ∧ Ap, CI ⊢ ¬Ap ∧ CS ,¬CS
p, pf, b ⊢ CS ∧ Ap ∧ (¬Ap ∧ CS),¬CS , CI
p, pf, b ⊢ CI
Which means that a bundle can be installed if the validity of all the Sensitive
Calls CS is implied by the list of Authorized Calls Ap. Otherwise, only the non
sensitive calls can be executed, which mean that the bundle can not be installed
for normal execution.
B Static Permissions for N Component - Demonstration
The demonstration of the Theorem for validating CBAC for one component can
be prove through sequent Calculus:
CBAC NC =
bi ⊢ {b}j
bi ⊢ bj ∧ bk ∧ . . . ∧ bq bj ⊢ PSCbj bi ⊢ CSpf,bi
bi ⊢ bj ∧ bk ∧ . . . ∧ bq, CSpf,bi , bj ⇒ PSCbj
bi ⊢ CSpf,bi , PSCbj ∧ PSCbk ∧ . . . ∧ PSCbq pi, pf ⊢ Api
bi, pi, pf ⊢ Api ∧ CSpf,bi , Api ∧ PSCbj ∧ PSCbk ∧ . . . ∧ PSCbq
bi, pi, pf ⊢ Api ∧ (CSpf,bi ∨ PSC{b}j )
bi, pi, pf ⊢ Api ∧ PSC{b}i
Which describes a Component Platform pf , with a given bundle bi to be
installed, provider by a bundle provider pi. Under this configuration, the con-
junction of the Sensitive methods called directly or indirectly by the bundle i,
noted PSC{b}i and the list of Authorized methods by the security policy Api
must be valid.
Which is tantamount to:
If Permission is given:
CBAC NC =
PSC{b}i ⊢ Ap ∧ PSC{b}i
bi, pi, pf ⊢ Api ∧ PSC{b}i ⊢ Ap ∧ PSC{b}i ,¬PSC{b}i
bi, pi, pf ⊢ Api ∧ PSC{b}i ∧ Ap ∧ PSC{b}i ,¬PSC{b}i
bi, pi, pf ⊢ Api ∧ PSC{b}i ,¬PSC{b}i
If Permission is refused:
CBAC NC =
PSC{b}i ⊢ ¬Ap ∧ PSC{b}i
bi, pi, pf ⊢ Api ∧ PSC{b}i ⊢ ¬Ap ∧ PSC{b}i ,¬PSC{b}i
bi, pi, pf ⊢ Api ∧ PSC{b}i ∧ ¬Ap ∧ PSC{b}i ,¬PSC{b}i
bi, pi, pf ⊢ ¬PSC{b}i
Which means that a bundle can be installed if the validity of all the Sensitive
Calls PSC{b}i performed directly or indirectly bu the bundle i is implied by
the list of Authorized Calls Ap. Otherwise, only the non sensitive calls can be
executed, which mean that the bundle can not be installed for normal execution.
